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How	European	integration	affects	blame	games	in
national	politics
When	things	go	wrong,	governments	frequently	attempt	to	deflect	the	blame
by	shifting	it	onto	other	actors,	such	as	previous	administrations.	However,	as
Tim	Heinkelmann-Wild,	Lisa	Kriegmair	and	Berthold	Rittberger	write,
European	integration	has	provided	governments	with	additional	opportunities
for	blame	avoidance,	such	as	criticising	the	EU’s	institutions	or	other	EU
member	states.	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	they	explain	how	the	integration
process	has	affected	national	blame	games.
Blame	games	between	government	and	opposition	are	a	characteristic	feature	of	politics	in	democracies.	While
opposition	parties	seek	every	opportunity	to	blame	the	government	for	allegedly	bad	policy	decisions,	governing
parties	try	to	either	shun	blame	or	direct	it	to	other	actors,	such	as	the	previous	government.
European	integration	has	altered	the	opportunity	structure	of	domestic	blame	games.	As	EU	actors	and	institutions
have	seen	their	authority	increase,	domestic	blame	games	have	become	increasingly	Europeanised.	But	how
exactly	does	EU	integration	affect	domestic	blame	games?	When	do	political	parties	take	recourse	to	the	additional
blame	opportunities	that	EU	integration	has	in	stock,	such	as	pointing	fingers	at	EU	institutions	or	other	EU	member
state	governments?
We	argue	that	EU	integration	affects	domestic	blame	games	in	two	ways.	First,	national	governments	can	drive	the
Europeanisation	of	national	blame	games	by	externalising	blame	to	evade	the	opposition’s	criticism.	Second,	the
Europeanisation	of	domestic	blame	games	is	facilitated	by	the	delegation	of	authority	to	the	EU:	with	EU
policymakers	in	the	spotlight,	they	are	veritable	blame	attractors.	The	question	of	who	implements	–	national
authorities	or	EU	actors	–	is	crucial	for	understanding	the	Europeanisation	of	domestic	blame	games.
First,	when	the	authority	to	implement	rests	with	national	authorities,	the	Europeanisation	of	national	blame	games
follows	a	blame-shifting	logic.	Their	implementing	authority	renders	national	executives	highly	visible	in	the	public.
They	are	therefore	a	plausible	target	for	blame	attributions.	Opposition	parties	seize	this	opportunity	and	blame
‘their’	government	for	contested	policies.	National	governments,	in	turn,	seek	to	deflect	blame.	The	institutional
complexities	of	the	EU	provide	them	with	opportunities	for	blame	shifting.	As	they	share	policymaking	authority	with
other	member	states,	governments	seek	to	diffuse	responsibility	by	pointing	to	the	complicity	of	other	governments.
In	this	scenario,	blame	assigned	to	Brussels	and	other	capitals	is	a	corollary	of	the	classic	opposition-government
dynamics.
The	blame	attributions	of	members	of	parliament	(MPs)	in	the	Austrian	Nationalrat	and	the	German	Bundestag	for
the	EU	asylum	system	illustrate	this	blame	shifting	logic.	The	asylum	system	regulates	which	member	state	is
responsible	for	administering	asylum	claims	by	people	entering	the	Union.	In	addition,	it	defines	minimum	standards
for	reception	conditions	and	procedures.	Member	state	governments	are	responsible	for	implementing	the	policy.
Figure	1	highlights	that	opposition	parties	in	Austria	and	Germany	were	very	active	in	blaming	‘their’	national
governments	(67%	of	all	blame	statements).	For	instance,	opposition	politicians	criticised	the	government	for
overburdening	first-arrival	states	at	the	EU’s	external	border	and	their	maltreatment	of	asylum	seekers.	Confronted
with	considerable	blame	pressure,	government	MPs	sought	to	divert	blame	by	shifting	it	onto	EU-level	policymakers
(60%	of	all	blame	statements).	For	example,	MPs	from	governing	parties	in	Austria	and	Germany	criticised	the	EU
for	its	allegedly	too	liberal	asylum	system	and	first-arrival	states	for	waving	through	migrants	without	registration.
Figure	1:	Two	cases	of	Europeanised	domestic	blame	games	(blame	attributions	per	100	debates)
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Second,	when	the	authority	to	implement	rests	with	EU-level	actors,	the	Europeanisation	of	national	blame	games
follows	a	delegation	logic.	In	the	absence	of	domestic	implementing	authority,	national	executives	are	less	visible	in
the	public.	With	EU-level	implementers	now	in	the	spotlight,	national	governments	are	less	plausible	targets	for	the
oppositions’	blame	attributions.	Consequently,	opposition	parties’	blame	will	thus	chiefly	target	EU-level	actors
rather	than	the	government.	National	governments,	in	turn,	prefer	to	duck	and	cover	behind	the	complexities	of	EU
policymaking	rather	than	joining	the	opposition	in	doubling	down	on	blaming	Brussels.	After	all,	someone	could	start
asking	who	is	responsible	for	EU-level	decisions	in	the	first	place?
Austrian	and	German	MPs’	blame	attributions	in	the	context	of	the	EU’s	border	control	policy	is	a	case	in	point.	The
protection	of	the	EU’s	external	borders	places	Frontex	in	a	focal	position.	This	kept	the	opposition	from	blaming
‘their’	government	for	contributing	to	the	death	of	migrants	either	by	not	doing	enough	–	as	a	result	of	their
restricted	mandate	and	limited	resources	–	or	by	doing	too	much	–	by	attracting	migrants	to	take	the	dangerous
route	across	the	Mediterranean.	Consequently,	70%	of	all	opposition	blame	statements	are	directed	at	EU-level
actors.	And	in	the	absence	of	blame	pressure,	the	Austrian	and	German	governments	chose	to	duck	and	cover.
Different	institutional	settings	of	EU	policymaking	thus	give	rise	to	two	logics	of	‘Europeanised’	blame	games.	When
policy	implementation	lies	with	member	states,	blaming	‘Brussels’	is	the	result	of	governments’	efforts	to	evade
opposition	blame	by	shifting	it	to	external	EU	actors.	When	EU-level	actors	carry	out	implementing	tasks,	the	EU’s
visibility	attracts	blame	from	the	opposition,	allowing	governments	to	duck	and	cover.	The	delegation	of
implementing	authority	to	the	EU-level	obviously	offers	national	governments	a	convenient	opportunity	to	avoid
being	held	accountable	by	the	opposition.	The	irony	is	that	by	choosing	to	hide	and	cover,	governments	are	silently
complicit	in	the	gradual	de-legitimation	of	the	EU.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	Politics	and	Governance
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Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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